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We propose and implement a method that provides quantitative estimates of the
extent to which higher-than-expected inflation can lower the real value of outstand-
ing government debt. Looking forward, we derive a formula for the debt burden that
relies on detailed information about debt maturity and claimholders, and that uses
option prices to construct risk-adjusted probability distributions for inflation at di↵er-
ent horizons. The estimates suggest that it is unlikely that inflation will lower the US
fiscal burden significantly, and that the e↵ect of higher inflation is modest for plausible
counterfactuals. If instead inflation is combined with financial repression that ex post
extends the maturity of the debt, then the reduction in value can be significant.
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1 Introduction
A higher inflation target has some benefits, and one of its most celebrated is to erode the
real value of outstanding debt. While across centuries and countries, a common way that
sovereigns have paid for high public debt is by having higher, and sometimes even hyper,
inflation, this rarely came without some or all of fiscal consolidation, financial repression, and
partial default (Reinhart and Rogo↵, 2009). As a result, the e↵ectiveness of higher inflation
in alleviating the fiscal burden of a country both in the past and in the future is an open
empirical question. A pressing application of this question is: with U.S. total public debt at
its highest ratio of GDP since 1947, would higher inflation be an e↵ective way to pay for it?
Providing an answer requires tackling two separate issues. The first is to calculate by
how much would 1% unanticipated and permanently higher inflation lower the debt burden.
If all of the U.S. public debt outstanding in 2012 (101% of GDP) were held in private hands,
if it were all nominal, and if it all had a maturity equal to the average (5.4 years), then a
quick back-of-the-envelope answer is 5.5%.1 However, we will show that this approximation
is misleading. In fact, we estimate that the probability that the reduction in U.S. debt is as
large as 5.5% of GDP is below 0.05%. The approximation is inaccurate since the underlying
assumptions are inaccurate. The debt number is exaggerated because large shares of the debt
are either held by other branches of the government or have payments indexed to inflation
and the maturity number is inaccurate because it does not take into account the maturity
composition of privately-held nominal debt.
The second issue is that assuming a sudden and permanent increase in inflation by
an arbitrary amount (1% in the above example) is empirically not helpful. After all, if
1To justify this calculation, assume the government owes X, all due in m periods. Its current market value
is V = Xe (r+⇡)m with continuous-time discounting and where r is the real interest rate and ⇡ is the rate
of inflation, both assumed to be constant. Then @V/@⇡ =  mV . An alternative justification assumes that
the government owes an amount Xe t/m at every future date t, so the distribution of outstanding debt is
exponential. Its market value today then is: X/(r+⇡+1/m). Since the nominal interest was approximately
zero in 2012, we get approximately the same answer.
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the price level could suddenly jump to infinity, the entire nominal debt burden would be
trivially eliminated. It is important first to recognize that inflation is stochastic, and that
investors will take this risk into account when pricing and choosing to hold government
debt—if investors anticipated sudden infinite inflation, they would not be willing to hold
government debt at a positive price. Second, the central bank does not perfectly control
inflation, so that even if it wanted to raise inflation by 1% it might not be able to. Moreover,
there are many possible paths to achieving higher inflation, either doing so gradually or
suddenly, permanently or transitorily, in an expected or unexpected way, and we would like
to know how they vary in e↵ectiveness. Therefore, it is important to consider counterfactual
experiments that economic agents believe are possible.
This paper addresses both issues, by proposing and implementing a method to accurately
estimate the e↵ect of plausible levels of inflation on the real value of debt. Section 2 starts
by deriving a simple formula for the fiscal burden of outstanding debt. By taking a forward-
looking approach to the intertemporal government budget constraint, we show that the real
value of debt is equal to a weighted average of the payments due at di↵erent horizons,
with the weights given by the expected inverse of compounded risk-adjusted inflation. The
formula makes transparent how high inflation can a↵ect the fiscal burden via these weights.
Section 3 collects data on the maturity structure of payments associated with Treasury
securities made by the federal government to various entities. We focus first on private
holdings, then separate private holdings between domestic and foreign, and finally single
out the Federal Reserve in the public holdings.2 We find that the private sector holds a
disproportionate share of the debt of shorter maturities and very few longer maturities,
whereas the Federal Reserve’s portfolio has the opposite composition. We show that this
di↵erence in composition results in private holdings having a lower exposure to inflation than
the Federal Reserve.
2We refer to marketable debt held by the private sector as private holdings.
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We next construct risk-adjusted distributions for inflation. Section 4 introduces data
on inflation contracts in the form of inflation caps and floors with payo↵s that depend on
the realizations of CPI inflation. Exploring the variety of contracts that are traded with
di↵erent strike prices, we extract the implied stochastic discount factors for inflation used by
market participants at di↵erent maturities. We build on, and go beyond, the calculations in
contemporaneous work by Kitsul and Wright (2013) and Fleckenstein, Longsta↵ and Lustig
(2013), providing maturity structures of risk-adjusted marginal density functions for both
cumulative inflation and one-year forward inflation.
Combing both sets of marginal densities, section 5 proposes a new method to estimate
the joint risk-adjusted distribution of inflation at di↵erent future horizons. Our method has
the intriguing feature that it uses no time-series data on the realizations of inflation. It
is based entirely on the information provided by the di↵erent options contracts at a given
date, and relies on the theory of copulas. The joint distributions allow us to calculate novel
value-at-risk measures of the debt debasement due to inflation, and to consider a rich set of
counterfactual inflation distributions to investigate what drives the results.
Using all these inputs, section 6 calculates the probability that the present value of debt
debasement due to inflation is larger than any given threshold. The 5th percentile of this
value at risk calculation is a mere 3.1% of GDP, and any loss above 4.2% has less than 1%
probability. Interestingly, much of the e↵ect of inflation would fall on foreign holders of the
government debt, who hold the longer maturities. The Federal Reserve, which also holds
longer maturities, would also su↵er larger capital losses.
Section 7 explores what is behind the modest e↵ect of inflation on the fiscal burden by
analyzing a series of counterfactuals. The result is driven by two complementary factors.
First, the maturity of U.S government debt that is privately held is quite low. By comparison,
we show that with the outstanding debt composition of 2000 the e↵ects would be more than
one third higher. Second and related, over short horizons of a few years, market participants
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place a very low probability on U.S. inflation being significantly high. In the near term,
there is much debt but little extra inflation, and for longer horizons, there can be significant
inflation but there is little debt. The total resulting e↵ect is small.
Section 8 explores the role of an active policy tool that interacts with inflation and is often
used in developing countries: financial repression. It drives a wedge between market interest
rates and the interest rate on government bonds, and acts as a tax on the existing holders
of the government debt. We show that extreme financial repression, where bondholders are
paid with reserves at the central bank which they must hold for a fixed number of periods,
is equivalent to ex post extending the maturity of the debt. Under such circumstances
inflation has a much larger impact, such that if repression lasts for a decade, permanently
higher inflation that previously lowered the real value of debt by 3.7% now lowers it by 23%
of GDP.
Section 9 concludes with suggestions for further research.
In terms of its place in the literature, our paper is one in a long list that studies the
link between fiscal policy and inflation. More recently, Cochrane (2011b) and Davig, Leeper
and Walker (2011) have argued that high levels of U.S. debt may lead to higher inflation
through the fiscal theory of the price level, while Aizenman and Marion (2011) argue that
policymakers have a strong incentive to inflate this debt. Our goal is more applied as we
quantify the amount by which inflation can actually lower the public debt burden. Our
estimates might be useful to calibrate this class of models in the future.
Closer to our question, Hall and Sargent (2011) provide an accounting decomposition of
the evolution of public debt applied to U.S. historical data, while Reinhart and Sbrancia
(2011) emphasize how inflation coupled with financial repression helped developed countries
pay their debts after World War II. Our methods are instead forward looking, so we can
consider di↵erent counterfactual scenarios. We confirm some of their key results, showing
that it is the interaction between financial repression and long maturities of debt that allows
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for significant e↵ects of inflation. At the same time, we exploit the risk-adjusted joint
distribution of inflation to derive a set of richer predictions that depend on the dynamics of
inflation, and we use a simpler and forward looking formula for the debt burden.
Berndt, Lustig and Yeltekin (2012) and Chung and Leeper (2007) use vector autoregres-
sions to estimate the impact of fiscal spending shocks on di↵erent terms in the intertemporal
budget constraint. We focus on inflation shocks instead, and we directly measure the impact
on future discount rates using inflation options data. Giannitsarou and Scott (2008) show
that fiscal imbalances do not help to forecast future inflation in six advanced economies. We
instead use options market data to make forecasts, and we do not ask whether in the past
governments have used inflation to pay for debts, but rather what would be the impact of
doing so today. Our goal is to understand what the limits are to using the option to inflate,
rather than to ask whether or not that option has been chosen in the past.
Aizenman and Marion (2011) and Bohn (2011) also consider counterfactuals about the
future, but they make rough approximations of the maturity of the privately-held debt and
treat inflation as deterministic. We tackle these two issues directly and as precisely as
possible. Our data should make these approximations no longer necessary in the future.
Krause and Moyen (2013) use a DSGE model that makes many structural and behavioral
assumptions in order to investigate several links through which inflation may a↵ect debt,
fiscal surpluses, and seignorage. We only assume no arbitrage in the government debt mar-
ket, and focus exclusively on the debasement of debt. At the same time, they use several
approximations in treating the data, whereas we go into more detail. Faraglia et al. (2013)
and Leeper and Zhou (2013) also write DSGE models to study how optimal inflation depends
on the maturity of government debt partly through its e↵ect on the real value of debt. In
the other direction, Missale and Blanchard (1994) study how the maturity of debt depends
on the government’s credibility to keep inflation low. Our goal is positive, not normative,
and again our estimates should allow researchers to calibrate their models.
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Higher inflation also redistributes wealth between di↵erent domestic households, or be-
tween them and foreigners (Doepke and Schneider (2006); Berriel (2013)). We focus on
the redistribution from private holders of debt, domestic or foreign, to the fiscal authority.
Moreover, higher inflation may also raise fiscal surpluses, for instance by raising seignorage
(Hilscher, Raviv and Reis, 2014), but here we consider only its e↵ects on the real value
of debt outstanding. Our estimates provide one valuable piece to assess the redistributive
e↵ects of inflation, but there are more pieces that future research can investigate.
Finally, while there are many ways to extract objective and subjective probability fore-
casts for inflation, including financial prices, surveys, and economic and statistical models,
these methods tend to forecast the mean while being silent on higher moments. Crucially,
they are not appropriate for pricing. Our goal is to measure the market value of di↵erent
policies, so we need the risk-neutral probabilities that are relevant for pricing the govern-
ment debt. Together with Kitsul and Wright (2013) and Fleckenstein, Longsta↵ and Lustig
(2013), we are one of the first papers to extract the risk-neutral density for inflation from
option contracts and use it to ask macroeconomic questions. Kitsul and Wright (2013) look
at the response of the density around monetary policy announcements, while Fleckenstein,
Longsta↵ and Lustig (2013) assess the risk of deflation in the United States. We ask a dif-
ferent question. Moreover, whereas they only use data on cumulative inflation, we are the
first to construct distributions of one year forward inflation as well, and to integrate cumu-
lative and forward inflation data to estimate a risk-adjusted joint distribution for inflation
at di↵erent horizons.3
3One-year forward distributions are constructed from year-on-year inflation options, whose payo↵ depends
on the realization of inflation over one-year periods.
7
2 Theory: the debt burden and risk-neutral densities
Our goal is to measure the fall in the debt burden due to higher inflation. This requires
coming up with a workable definition of the debt burden, seeing the e↵ect of inflation on it,
and estimating its size. This section derives a simple formula that accomplishes these three
goals.
2.1 The public debt














Going over each of the terms on the right-hand side: Bjt is the par value of zero-coupon
nominal debt held at date t that has a maturity of j years, so that at date t the government
expects to pay Bjt dollars at date t+ j. K
j
t is the par value of real debt held at date t that
has a maturity of j years, referring mostly to Treasury inflation protected securities (TIPS).
Hjt is the market price (or inverse-yield) at which nominal debt with a maturity of j years
trades at date t. Likewise, Qjt is the price (or inverse-yield) of TIPS with a maturity of j
years at date t. Finally, Pt is the price level, and we will use the notation ⇡t,t+j = Pt+j/Pt
to denote gross cumulative inflation between two dates. The following normalizations apply:
H0t = Q
0
t = 1 and P0 = 1.
Modeling the government debt this way involves some simplifications. First, the gov-
ernment often has a wide variety of non-market outstanding debt. The implicit assumption
above is that their price is the same as that of marketable debt, which should be the case
through the forces of arbitrage between these di↵erent securities. Second, it assumes that
coupon-paying bonds can be priced as portfolios of zero-coupon bonds. In this way, we
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limit the huge variety of debt instruments issued by the government and simply consider
promised payments (either principal or coupon payments) at each point in time. Again, ar-
bitrage should imply that this assumption is reasonable. Third, unfunded nominal liabilities
of the government like Social Security could be included in Bjt , and the real assets (and real
liabilities) of the government could be included in Kjt . Theoretically, they pose no problem.
In practice, measuring any of these precisely, or taking into account their lower liquidity, is
a challenge that goes beyond this paper, so we will leave them out.
If all debt were short-term, then the expression in equation (1) would reduce to B0t /Pt+
K0t . The simple rule of thumb that an increase in Pt lowers the debt burden proportionately
to the privately-held nominal debt is accurate. However, with longer maturities, future
inflation and higher future price levels a↵ect yields and so also the value of debt. Without
knowing how yields of di↵erent government liabilities depend on inflation, this equation
cannot answer our question.
2.2 The law of motion for debt
To pay for the debt, the government must either collect a real fiscal primary surplus of st,
or borrow more from the private sector:













Combining the previous two equations provides a law of motion for debt. Looking forward


















































This equation makes apparent why it is di cult to answer our question. Inflation can
a↵ect almost every term on the right-hand side without a clear way to decompose them.
Worse, in order to judge how a particular path for inflation {⇡0,i}ti=0 a↵ects the fiscal burden,
we would need to know how inflation will change the slope of the yield curve at every maturity
(the Hj+1i  H1iHji+1 term) or the maturity composition and the share of nominal versus real
bonds that future governments will issue and the private sector will choose to hold (the Bji+1
term). Likewise, we would need to know the link between inflation and the real yield curve
(the Qj+1i  Q1iQji+1 term) as well as the ex post di↵erences between nominal and real returns
(the H1i Pi+1/Pi Q1i term). Finally, recall that this expression holds for every possible path
of inflation as well as for realization of uncertainty in the economy. Therefore, there is an
unwieldy large number of possible measures of how much the fiscal burden will change in
the future.
Hall and Sargent (2011), and many that preceded them, partially overcome these prob-
lems by using a version of this equation that looks backwards, instead of forward, in time.
Given debt in the present (Wt+1) and in the past (W0), there are historical data on most of
the terms above. However, this decomposition of the factors a↵ecting the evolution of the
debt is only able to measure the e↵ect of inflation while keeping fixed every other interest
rate, fiscal surplus, and outstanding bonds, so it is not possible to isolate the impact of
inflation alone on the public debt. Moreover, our question requires us to look forward to
figure out how debt depends on future, not past, inflation.
2.3 Looking forward: the intertemporal budget constraint
Our approach relies on one assumption: that there is a stochastic discount factor to price
all of these government liabilities. It is well understood that this is equivalent to requiring
the absence of arbitrage. While there is evidence against no-arbitrage across all assets
(Cochrane, 2011a), note that all we require is that there is no arbitrage between Treasuries
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of di↵erent maturities. U.S. government bond markets are one of the most liquid in the
world, have fewer restrictions on short-selling, and serve as the fundamental asset for many
traded derivatives. Moreover, note that we do not require the stochastic discount factor to be
unique, so we are not assuming complete markets. We are also not excluding the possibility
that there are varying risk premia or excess profits across di↵erent maturities, as in models
of segmented markets or preferred habitats, so we are not ruling out possible liquidity premia
or the e↵ectiveness of quantitative easing policies. We have the much weaker assumption
that there is no risk-free arbitrage across maturities of Treasuries.4
The stochastic discount factor at date t for a real payo↵ at date t+j is denoted by mt,t+j,












A nominal discount bond costs Hjt /Pt in real units at date t, and pays o↵ 1/Pt+j real units
in j periods; its return times the stochastic discount factor has to have an expectation of
1. Likewise for a real bond. The absence of arbitrage over time implies that the stochastic
discount factors across any two maturities, n and j are linked by: mt,t+j = mt,t+nmt+n,t+j
for 1  n  j.
Multiplying by stochastic discount factors at di↵erent dates and taking expectations of
equation (3), while taking the limit as time goes to infinity and imposing that the government






















4Our construction of risk-neutral distributions in section 4 also requires no arbitrage in the inflation
derivatives market.
5We could allow for bubbles or Ponzi schemes by the government. As long as their value does not depend
on inflation, then proposition 1 below is unchanged.
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The first equality provides a workable measure of the debt burden. The government
liabilities were fixed in the past, so this expression depends only on real discount factors
looking into the future and the distribution of all future price levels. Moreover, it shows that
because the real payments do not depend on inflation, we can focus on the nominal debt to
assess the e↵ect of inflation.
The second equality shows that we can interpret our measure as saying how much fewer
taxes the government can collect by lowering the debt burden. Higher inflation may not only
lower the real payments on the outstanding nominal debt, but also change primary fiscal
surpluses. In companion work (Hilscher, Raviv and Reis, 2014), we measure one of these
e↵ects through the seignorage revenues that higher inflation generates. But the question in
this paper is what is the e↵ect of inflation on the outstanding public debt, and expression 5
shows that this depends on outstanding nominal debt alone.
2.4 A formula for the debt burden as a weighted average
The only uncertainty in how much will pay the outstanding nominal debts that mature in t
periods is on the realization of the price level. Therefore, even though the stochastic discount
factor depends, in principle, on all sources of uncertainty in the economy, only its marginal
distribution with respect to inflation will lead to non-zero terms once we multiply by inverse




























The second equality uses the standard definition of a risk-neutral density f(.), where Rt is
the real risk-free return between 0 and t from the perspective of date 0. By definition, it
does not depend on future realizations of inflation.
Combining all the results gives our formula for the debt burden as a function of inflation.
12
Proposition 1. The debt burden is a weighted average of the nominal payments that the















This formula makes clear how future inflation a↵ects the debt burden today. It explicitly
takes into account that inflation is stochastic and not perfectly controlled by policy. It is
forward looking, and it delivers a single number, in spite of all the possible future realizations
for inflation. It depends on inflation only, as all of its relevant e↵ects on prices are captured
in the inflation densities. This includes the possible e↵ect of inflation on real interest rates
through Fisher e↵ects, or changes over time in the compensation for inflation risk, or in
liquidity premia, since the relevant densities are for risk-adjusted inflation. Finally, it allows
for a discussion of counterfactuals that is somewhat disciplined, in terms of either di↵erent
realizations from these densities or shifts in the densities themselves. Therefore, it satisfies
all of the requirements that we laid out to answer our question.
Using this formula requires two key inputs: the payments due to private investors, and
the risk-adjusted density for inflation at each future maturity. The next two sections explain
how we measure them for the United States.
3 Data: U.S. Treasuries by holder and maturity
The total U.S. federal debt at the end of 2012, reported by the Bureau of the Public Debt, was
$16.4 trillion, or 101% of GDP. Yet, this number does not distinguish between nominal and
indexed bonds, or include information about the maturity structure. Moreover, it includes
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debt held by di↵erent branches of the U.S. government, even though we want to measure
net government liabilities since any gains of the Treasury at the expense of Social Security,
or any other government account, will sooner or later have to be covered by the Treasury.
3.1 Data on holdings of U.S. Treasuries at di↵erent maturities
The appendix describes our multiple data sources. The main source of data is the Center
for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) that reports the private holdings of all outstanding
marketable government notes and bonds at the end of 2012.6 We measure monthly total
nominal payments, using both face value and coupons at each maturity. We also adjust
the size of payments to exclude holdings by state and local governments. Then, we use
the nominal yield curve to evaluate the formula in equation (1). The total market value of
privately-held marketable nominal Treasury securities at the end of 2012 was $8.3 trillion,
or 51.2% of GDP.7
It is instructive to compare the headline debt number of $16.4 trillion reported by the
Treasury to our baseline number. For this purpose we focus on face values, as reported
by the Monthly Statement of the Public Debt. The CRSP data does not include non-
marketable securities ($5.4 trillion), the vast majority of which are part of intragovernment
holdings ($4.8 trillion). The largest single such holding ($2.6 trillion) is the Federal Old-Age
and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund (Social Security). Since we focus on nominal debt, we
exclude the amount of outstanding TIPS ($0.8 trillion), which are almost exclusively held
by the private sector. We next adjust the CRSP amounts to take account of the share
of debt held by state and local governments, especially in state and local pension funds.8
6We build on Hall and Sargent (2011) and significantly extend their work, to a finer distribution of
maturities, to consider di↵erent claimholders, and to use more sources of data.
7We can calculate this number according to equation (7) instead. The discrepancy is negligible, equal to
about $12 billion.
8We do not include debt issued by state and local government, estimated by the Census to amount to
$2.9 trillion in 2011. There is a large variety of these debt instruments, and no good source that reports
their private holdings. We therefore restrict ourselves to federal debt.
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Holdings are approximately 7.5% of total privately held debt. Finally, while the number
so far is misleadingly called “debt held by the public” by the Treasury Bulletin, it includes
the holdings by the Federal Reserve. Any losses on the portfolio of the central bank will
map directly into smaller seignorage payments to the Treasury (Hall and Reis, 2013), so the
same argument that excludes Social Security holdings applies to Federal Reserve holdings
($1.6 trillion). Combining all of these numbers, we arrive at a face value of $8 trillion, which
corresponds closely to the face value of debt constructed from CRSP.
Next, we break private holdings into domestic and foreign by maturity. Foreigners held
$5.3 trillion in Treasury debt, or 33% of GDP. We also use data on holdings by Chinese
investors, the largest holders of debt, which account for 6.9% of GDP.9
Finally, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York keeps the information on each bond held
by the Federal Reserve in its System Open Market Account (SOMA). We use this information
to also obtain detailed holdings for the Federal Reserve at each maturity. Valued at $1.9
trillion these are not included in our baseline estimates, but we will consider them separately
in the analysis.
3.2 The maturity distribution of holdings
Figure 1 shows Bt0 as a function of t using monthly data. A noticeable feature of the
distribution is how concentrated it is on the short end. The average maturity of the U.S.
government debt, weighted by private holdings, is 4.8 years according to our calculations.
This is well below the 5.4 years reported by the Treasury for all outstanding debt.10
Moreover, it is salient from figure 1 that a simple approximation, like assuming a single
bond with a maturity equal to the average, or an exponential distribution, is not appropriate.
The maturity distribution decays very quickly in the first few years, then flattens between
9These amounts probably over-state how much foreigners ultimately hold, since they include holdings in
o↵shore financial centers, some of which may be by American citizens.
10The Treasury estimate comes from the Quarterly Refunding Documents.
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5 and 10 years, becomes close to zero between 10 to 25 years partly because of the lack of
issuance of 30-year bonds between 2001 and 2006, and then picks up between 25 and 30
years.
Figure 2 aggregates to the annual frequency, and plots also the foreign holdings (so
domestic is the di↵erence between private and foreigners), together with the Fed’s holdings.
Private domestic holdings of U.S. Treasuries are concentrated in low maturities, with little
holdings above 5 years. Foreigners account for a larger share of the 5-10 year holdings, and
the Federal Reserve holds a disproportionate share of maturities above 5 years partly due to
quantitative easing policies.
4 The marginal densities for inflation
The weights in equation (8) require knowing the term structure of risk-free real rates and
the risk-adjusted density of inflation at di↵erent horizons. For the former, we use standard
estimates of the real yield curve from Gu¨rkaynak, Sack and Wright (2010). For the densities,
we use new data on option contracts.11
4.1 The data on zero-coupon and year-on-year inflation options
The market for over-the-counter USD inflation options emerged in 2002 and it has grown at
a very fast rate, especially after 2008. Kitsul and Wright (2013) and Fleckenstein, Longsta↵
and Lustig (2013) use data from these markets as well, and argue that since 2009 the market
has been liquid enough to reliably reflect market expectations of inflation.12 We use daily
data of caps and floors on CPI inflation on December 31 of 2012.13
11The appendix contains more details on the data, the method to estimate the distributions, and several
robustness checks.
12Kitsul and Wright (2013) write that by 2011, trading in the inter-dealer market was close to $ 22 billion,
while J.P. Morgan (2013) estimates the annual trading volume in inflation derivatives at the start of 2013
was $50 billion.
13The appendix looks at dates nearby to ensure there was nothing special about this particular date.
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Like Kitsul and Wright (2013) and Fleckenstein, Longsta↵ and Lustig (2013), we use
data on zero-coupon caps and floors that pay o↵ if cumulative inflation between the start
of the contract and its maturity lies above or below the annually compounded strike price.
The strike price ranges from  2% to 3% (floors) and 1% to 6% (caps), in 0.5% increments.
We have data for all maturities between 1 and 10 years, together with data for 12 and 15
years, which we will use to check our estimates.
Unlike Kitsul and Wright (2013) and Fleckenstein, Longsta↵ and Lustig (2013), we also
use data on year-on-year inflation caps and floors. These contracts are portfolios of caplets
and floorlets that pay o↵ at the end of each year if inflation during that year is above or
below the strike price. Strike prices range from  3% to 6%. There seems to be no market
demand for instruments with strike prices outside of this range and indeed we find that
risk-adjusted probabilities outside this range are very low. The horizons of the year-on-year
options range from 1 to 10 years.
4.2 Estimating the risk-adjusted probability density of inflation
As the classic work of Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) noted, given a rich enough set
of option contracts with observable prices, it is possible to recover non-parametrically the
risk-neutral distribution of inflation without making any specific distributional assumption
about inflation or its link to other asset prices. The classic formula linking the risk-adjusted








Intuitively, if the price of a call declines quickly with the strike price, then the outcome at that
point is more likely. Because our data give us many option prices for di↵erent strike prices
and at di↵erent intervals, we can estimate this partial derivative by using the di↵erences in
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these prices.
In practice, the data require a considerable amount of cleaning. Aside from measurement
error, we face the di culty that the options in general are not traded simultaneously resulting
in call option pricing functions that are not always well behaved. To screen out such data,
first we drop option prices from the data if they contain simple arbitrage opportunities: (i)
if the call (put) premium does not monotonically decrease (increase) in the strike price, (ii)
if the option premium does not increase monotonically with maturity, and (iii) if butterfly
spreads that correspond to Arrow-Debreu prices do not have positive prices. Next, before we
take di↵erences of the data, we smooth it in implied volatility space: for each maturity, we
calculate Black and Scholes (1973) implied volatilities for all strike prices, smooth them with
a natural spline, and convert back to option prices. We then use equation (9) and the delta
method to calculate two finite di↵erences that approximate the second partial derivative.
Through this procedure, the data do not reveal point expectations of future inflation but
rather the risk-adjusted distributions for inflation in the future. That is, the distributions
reflect the likelihood of di↵erent values of inflation, the risk associated with them, and
the market price of this risk. This distinguishes our measures from many of the common
measures of inflation expectations. Unlike opinion surveys, we are extracting risk-neutral
rather than subjective expectations, and we do so from observing profit-making behavior.
Unlike the break-even rate of inflation from comparing real and nominal yields, we have
a whole distribution for inflation instead of a single number. Moreover, we do not need
to worry about the liquidity di↵erences between nominal bond and TIPS markets, or the
price of the embedded floor which ensures that TIPS always pay back at least par value.
Finally, unlike models of the term structure that use the yield curve to extract market-based
inflation expectations, our measure does not rely on the associated (often strong) identifying
assumptions in these models.
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4.3 The estimates
Using our data on zero-coupon floors and caps, we extract the density f(⇡t,t+j), with j =
1, .., 10. This gives a term structure of the cumulative risk-adjusted inflation distributions. In
turn, using data on year-on-year contracts, we construct forward risk-adjusted distributions
for year-on-year inflation f(⇡t+j 1,t+j). Figures 3 and 4 plot the distributions at the end of
2012.
Noticeably, the risk-adjusted mode of inflation in 2013 was only 1.25%.14 Beyond 5 years,
all of the distributions are bell-shaped and with similar median and mode, around 2.75%,
which reflects partly the Federal Reserve target, and partly the compensation for inflation
risk. All of the distributions have fat tails and are significantly non-normal. Depending on
the maturity, excess kurtosis is between 0.69 and 1.07. Kitsul and Wright (2013) interpret
the tails as reflecting investors’ perception that both very high and very low inflation are the
costly states of the world.
Another interesting feature of the distributions is that, as the horizon increases, the
variance does not fall. Rather, the standard deviation for cumulative inflation rises from
1.3% at maturity 5 to 1.5% by maturity 10. The distribution becomes more spread out,
either because extreme events far in the future are perceived as more costly, or because
there is more uncertainty about inflation. Likewise, for year-on-year inflation, the standard
deviations range between 1.3% and 2.2% in horizons 1 to 7, and are equal to 2.2% for
horizons 8 to 10. Still, the probability that average annual inflation exceeds 5.75% is at
most 5% across all horizons. Sustained high risk-adjusted inflation is perceived as being a
very remote possibility.
14Because of the 0.5% granularity of our data, we report the probability of lying between 1% and 1.5% as
1.25%.
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5 The joint distribution of inflation
To evaluate the weights in our formula, all that we need are the marginal distributions for
cumulative inflation in the previous section. However, for our experiments, we would like to
know the joint distribution of inflation across multiple years. With it, we can draw sequences
of inflation to evaluate the probability of di↵erent scenarios and we can flexibly consider a
series of di↵erent experiments.
5.1 A method of moments copula-based estimator
Understanding how the realizations of a random variable are related over time is, of course,
the classic problem in time-series modeling. Our particular data on inflation contracts pro-
vides a novel way to approach this problem that has the intriguing feature of only using data
at one date in time, by exploiting agents’ expectations in financial markets to recover their
beliefs about the time series of risk-adjusted inflation.
Consider the problem of obtaining the risk-adjusted joint density between annual inflation
over the next two years: f(ln ⇡t,t+1, ln ⇡t+1,t+2). Sklar (1959) shows that there exists a copula
function C(.) : [0, 1]2 ! [0, 1] such that:
f(ln ⇡t,t+1, ln ⇡t+1,t+2) = C (f(ln ⇡t,t+1), f(ln ⇡t+1,t+2)) . (10)
This function captures the co-dependence between the two random variables, so that we can
obtain the joint density given information on the marginals. We use a parametric version
of the copula function Cˆ (f(ln ⇡t,t+1), f(ln ⇡t+1,t+2), ⇢), so the unknown copula function is
fully characterized by a vector of parameters ⇢ in the known function Cˆ(.), where ⇢ is of
dimension M . The typical approach in the literature that estimates copulas would be to use
the time series for past inflation to estimate both the marginal densities and the parameters
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in ⇢. Our unusual data allows us to approach the problem quite di↵erently.
To start, we already have estimates of the marginal densities for year-on-year infla-
tion. Moreover, from the zero-coupon options, we also have another marginal distribution:




Cˆ (f(ln ⇡t,t+1), f(ln ⇡t+1,t+2), ⇢) d⇡t,t+1d⇡t+1,t+2. (11)
Since we have N bins on the marginal distributions, this expression gives N moment condi-
tions with which to estimate the M unknown parameters in ⇢.
The appendix extends this logic to show that:
Proposition 2. Given data for the marginal distributions of cumulative inflation f(ln ⇡t,t+j)
and year-on-year inflation f(ln ⇡t+j 1,t+j) for j = 1, ..., J , one can estimate the joint distri-
bution f(ln ⇡t,t+1, ln ⇡t+1,t+2, ... ln ⇡t+J 1,t+J) by estimating the M parameters in the ⇢ vector




Cˆ (f(ln ⇡t,t+1), ...f(ln ⇡t+J 1,t+J), ⇢) d ln ⇡t,t+1...d ln ⇡t+J 1,t+J . (12)
The integration set ⇧ is such that: ln ⇡t,t+1 + ...+ ln ⇡t+j 1,t+j = ln ⇡t,t+j, for j = 1, ..., J .
We can use these moments to estimate ⇢, akin to GMM, although these are not moments
of the distribution of the random variable, as is usual, but rather the distributions themselves.
Our data on options contracts only goes to 10 years, but the debt maturity goes all
the way to 30 years. For inflation beyond 10 years, we extrapolate by assuming that the
joint distribution is a stationary Markov process of order 9 with parameters given by the
distribution from 1 to 10 years. The appendix discusses the details.
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5.2 The estimates
We use a multivariate Gaussian copula, which has a single parameter to model the co-
dependence between any two variables. Therefore M = J(J   1)/2 = 45 since we have
inflation over 10 years, which is well below the number of moments (180). This copula does
not assume normality for inflation, it simply assumes that the joint dependence of inflation
over time resembles a normal distribution in the sense that if the marginals were normal,
then the multivariate would be normal, too.
We estimate two separate models of ⇢. One of them searches for the correlations that
minimize the equally-weighted squared deviations of the moments in proposition 2, subject
only to the restriction that the correlation between inflation at two maturities is between -1
and 1. This model has the virtue of putting no restrictions and exploiting our proposition
directly. Moreover, it fits the data quite well, in the sense that the discrepancies between
the two sides of the moment conditions in proposition 2 are visually small. Yet, its estimates
are hard to interpret. It is also di cult to understand intuitively what variation in the data
is driving the estimates.
We focus instead on a restricted model for risk-adjusted inflation dynamics that assumes
that the non-stationary component of inflation must be a random walk. This is a general-
ization of the common Beveridge-Nelson model for inflation that is frequently used. It has a
few virtues relative to the unrestricted model. First, it has only 10 parameters, all of which
are easy to interpret: the relative variance of the non-stationary and stationary components
of inflation, and the 9 autocorrelations of the stationary part. Second, it fits the data almost
as well as the unrestricted model, and it is easier to understand what in the data drives
the estimates. Third, there is an out-of-sample test of our estimation procedure that uses
only the maturities 1 to 10, which consists of comparing the copula model’s prediction for
cumulative inflation in years 12 and 15, for which we have data. In that test, the restricted
model performs slightly better. Anyway, our results are robust to using one or the other
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Table 1: Estimated correlation coe cients of year-on-year inflation in the joint distributiont_rho
Page 1
Maturity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 1.00 0.36 0.33 0.50 0.48 0.27 0.40 0.38 0.28 0.11
2 1.00 0.36 0.33 0.50 0.48 0.27 0.40 0.38 0.28
3 1.00 0.36 0.33 0.50 0.48 0.27 0.40 0.38
4 1.00 0.36 0.33 0.50 0.48 0.27 0.40
5 1.00 0.36 0.33 0.50 0.48 0.27
6 1.00 0.36 0.33 0.50 0.48
7 1.00 0.36 0.33 0.50
8 1.00 0.36 0.33
9 1.00 0.36
10 1.00
Notes: Estimated correlation coefficients for year-on-year inflation between date 2012+j and 
2012+I, in column j, row l.
model, both for the two main findings from the estimates that we discuss below, as well as
for the results on debt debasement.
The first finding is that, according to the options data, risk-adjusted inflation is a sta-
tionary process. In the restricted model, we estimate the variance of the random walk of
risk-adjusted inflation to be zero. Even in the unrestricted model, the estimated correlation
coe cients across maturities are only rarely above 0.6. This suggests that in risk-adjusted
terms, long-run inflation expectations are well anchored. To understand what drives this
result in the options data, note that if risk-adjusted inflation were non-stationary then the
variance of year-on-year inflation should increase with the horizon. Yet, figure 4 shows that
after 5 years the distributions do not spread out in a significant way.
Table 1 shows the estimated correlation parameters across maturities for the restricted
model. So even though there is strong evidence of stationarity, the second interesting result
is that the correlations fall only very slowly (if at all) with the horizon. Even as far as eight
years into the future, the autocorrelation is still 0.28, which seems far from well-anchored
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expectations. While stationary, risk-adjusted inflation is a process with a long memory,
where shocks persist for many years. Intuitively, figure 3 shows that the distribution of
cumulative average inflation does not shrink with the horizon, so agents must expect that
inflation reverts slowly to its long-run mean. Curiously, this is consistent with the findings
of Gu¨rkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) who also use market expectations of the future in
forward contracts to find that 10-year forward interest rates are highly correlated with 1-year
interest rates, much more than what usual mean-reverting models of short term rates would
suggest.
5.3 Interpreting the joint distributions
While we have been clear so far that all of these results are based on risk-adjusted distri-
butions of inflation, it is useful to take a step back and understand what this implies for
interpreting the results. When we refer to the distribution of inflation between any two
dates after 2012, this is conditional on information that is available in 2012. There is no
new information revealed by the joint distribution of 2016 and 2017 that a↵ects the joint
distributions between 2019 an 2020; both are measured given information in 2012.
Moreover, the relevant multi-period risk-adjusted expectation of inflation depends on the
product of actual inflation and state-dependent risk compensation, which includes anything
that changes marginal utility for di↵erent realizations of inflation. Our estimates have no
way of distinguishing whether the risk-adjusted correlations between inflation at di↵erent
horizons are due to serial correlation of actual inflation or of the stochastic discount factor.
A virtue of conjoining these two factors is that our estimates do not have to take a
stand on the contentious issue of the slope of the Phillips curve, or on whether and how are
inflation and real interest rates are correlated. This correlation is already taken into account
within the risk-adjusted distributions. Moreover, one might argue that governments weight
(or at least should weight) di↵erent inflation policies according to their e↵ect on welfare, so
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that because they adjust for the growth of marginal utility, risk-adjusted probabilities are
at least as useful as actual probabilities for considering policy (Veronesi and Zingales, 2010;
Kocherlakota, 2012).
The limitation of dealing with risk-adjusted inflation is that it makes it harder to compare
the estimation results with the findings on actual inflation. To do so, one needs a model that
provides identification restrictions to separate risk compensation from inflation, like that in
e.g., Fleckenstein, Longsta↵ and Lustig (2013). Exploring such a model in the context of
our estimates is high on the research agenda, but is best left for future work.
A concrete example perhaps makes these points clearer. When we evaluate the expec-





































Our first point is that all expectations are taken conditional on information at time 0.
Therefore, the last term in brackets in the first line is exactly equal to 1, no matter what state
gets realized at dates 1 and 2. Risk-adjustments (distributions of the stochastic discount
factor across future states) or real interest rates (conditional means of the stochastic discount
factor) may change over time, but that is taken into account by the date 0 expectation. Our
second point is that the covariance can depend on the correlation between ⇡0,1 and ⇡1,2, as
well as between m0,1 and m1,2, and between the two pairs. It takes a model for m0,t or for
⇡0,t to separate them.
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6 The distribution of debt debasement
Infinite sudden inflation would wipe out all of the nominal debt. However, market expecta-
tions of inflation should reflect this possibility. If in the inflation contracts that we observe,
investors place less than 10% probability on inflation being above 4%, scenarios where infla-
tion is suddenly infinity are of little relevance.
Using our densities for future inflation, we measure the probability that debt would fall
by di↵erent amounts. We do this in the context of proposition 1, that is, we consider the
present value of debt debasement. Using our estimated risk-adjusted joint distribution for
inflation, we draw a large number of histories and, ordering them by their impact on the real
value of debt, we estimate probabilities that debt will fall by some threshold. This is akin
to measures of risk-adjusted Value-at-Risk (VaR) that are often used.15 These measures
take into account all possible future scenarios for inflation as perceived today by market
participants, including changes in the policy of the central bank, shocks to inflation beyond
the control of monetary policy, and changes in risk-attitudes towards inflation.
Figure 5 shows the probability that the fiscal burden will fall by more than a few per-
centage points of GDP, according to the risk-adjusted distribution for inflation. Strikingly,
the numbers are all quite small. The probability that debt falls by more than 5% of GDP is
0.2%. Having the real value of the debt fall by at least 1% of GDP due to inflation variation
is likely, with a probability of 32% but anything more than only 3% of GDP has the quite
small probability of 5.3%.
Table 2 presents VaR measures separately for each investor. Most of the gains are at
the expense of foreigners, of which the largest nationality is Chinese. This happens not just
because they hold more debt than domestics, but mostly because they hold longer maturity
debt. Therefore, extreme situations where a succession of high realizations of annual inflation
15See, in particular, Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000) as well as Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996).
28












lead to large cumulative inflation a↵ect foreigners more than domestics.16
The last column in the table shows the e↵ect on a non-private holder of debt, the central
bank. The Federal Reserve would potentially su↵er large losses as a share of its portfolio.
Even though it holds much less debt than domestic private investors, the central bank loses
significantly more than they do. In 2012, the central bank held mostly long-term bonds,
which are more exposed to inflation risk.
16From the perspective of foreigners, how much they ultimately lose also depends on how much the
exchange rate devalues with the increase in inflation and on whether there are capital controls or not. We
are not measuring the foreigners’ losses. Rather, we are measuring how much the fiscal authority would gain
at their expense, which is not the same as the country’s gains. Our measure does not depend on whether the
holder is domestic or foreign, or what happens to the exchange rate, even if these factors would be important
for the impact of higher inflation on national welfare.
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Table 2: Percentiles of the distribution of the fall in the value of debt for bondholders
Percentile Privately held (51%)
Domestic   
(19%)
Foreign        
(32%)




  90th 2.4% 0.8% 1.6% 0.4% 1.2%
  95th 3.1% 1.1% 2.0% 0.5% 1.5%
  99th 4.2% 1.4% 2.8% 0.7% 2.0%
Holders of the debt
Notes: Each cell shows the cutoff in the reduction of the real present value of debt as a
share of GDP, so that the risk-adjusted probability of a larger loss (borne by the agent
in the column) is equal to one minus the percentile in the row.
7 Counterfactual estimates of debt debasement
We next explore the e↵ects of shifting the inflation distributions. This allows us to both
interpret the VaR results as well as to consider hypothetical scenarios of interest. It is also
similar to conducting stress tests. Importantly, note that these are shifts in the risk-adjusted
distribution for inflation, not changes in inflation per se. They are useful to understand how
di↵erent properties of inflation a↵ect the debt debasement e↵ect, but they do not cleanly
correspond to actual policy changes.17
In practice, for each counterfactual, we propose a new distribution fˆ(.), recalculate the
real value of the debt using equation (7), and subtract it from the market value of debt to
obtain our estimate of the fall in real debt.18 This approach is the stochastic equivalent
of asking what would happen if inflation was x% higher. As in the previous section, we
discipline the experiments using the data. The shift x is pinned down to be consistent with
the plausible set of scenarios in our original distribution f(.). Table 3 reports the results.
17Unlike the value at risk results in the previous section, but like any counterfactual exercise, these ex-
periments are potentially exposed to the Lucas critique. However, because these are shifts to risk-adjusted
distributions they do incorporate agents’ shifting expectations about inflation and risk. It is not the shifts
per se that are subject to criticism, but only their interpretation as policy changes.
18The appendix provides more details.
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7.1 Counterfactual 1: The impact of higher inflation
The first experiment shifts the marginal distributions for annual inflation at every maturity so
that the new median is at the old 90th percentile. We think of this experiment as capturing
an announcement that the inflation target of the Fed is now expected to be higher, as
suggested by Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro (2010).19
The second experiment instead sets the density within the 90th percentile to zero, and
scales the density outside of this range proportionately. This corresponds to a commitment
that inflation will be higher for sure in the future. Only inflation realizations at the right
tail of the current distribution become possible. At the same time, because there is no shift
to the right as in the first case, very high levels of inflation are also not that likely.
The table shows that the first experiment lowers the debt burden by 3.7% while the
second lowers it by 4.4%. Again, foreigners absorb a large share of the losses, because they
both hold more debt and especially at longer maturities. Again, in spite of holding 37% less
debt than domestic private bondholders, the Federal Reserve loses 37% more with inflation
because it holds longer maturity debt.
7.2 Counterfactual: the role of uncertainty
Because we have the full probability distribution for inflation, we can inspect what is the
e↵ect that uncertainty about inflation has on the real value of the debt.
Our third experiment again shifts the marginal density so the new median is the old
90th percentile, but now this is accomplished by scaling inflation proportionately at every
maturity. It is often said that higher average inflation comes with more variable inflation,
19Again to be clear, we are shifting the risk-neutral distribution of inflation, not the actual inflation target
of the central bank. The link between the two depends both on the e↵ectiveness of central bank policy
as well as on changes in private assessments of risk. In the extreme case where the central bank controls
the distribution of inflation, and where inflation is “pure” in the sense of Reis and Watson (2010), so that
changes in inflation are independent of changes in relative prices, the two are the same.
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Table 3: Counterfactual impact of higher inflation on the real present value of debt
Inflation counterfactual Privately held (51%)
Domestic   
(19%)
Foreign        
(32%)




  1. Permanently higher 3.7% 1.3% 2.3% 0.6% 1.8%
  2. Right tail only 4.4% 1.5% 2.9% 0.7% 2.1%
  3. Higher and more variable 3.4% 1.2% 2.2% 0.5% 1.7%
  4. Higher for sure 3.8% 1.4% 2.4% 0.6% 1.9%
  5. Partially anticipated 1.3% 0.4% 0.9% 0.2% 0.6%
  6. Temporary increase 1.2% 0.4% 0.8% 0.2% 0.4%
  7. Gradual increase 2.3% 0.9% 1.4% 0.3% 1.4%
Holders of the debt
Notes: Each cell shows the fall in the real real present value of debt as a ratio of GDP.
and this experiment tries to capture this possibility.
In the other direction, in the fourth counterfactual, we assume that year-on-year inflation
is exactly equal to the average inflation in our estimates. This shows what would happen if
inflation became deterministic, so we can understand better the e↵ect of volatility.
The fifth counterfactual studies a shift in inflation that is partially expected. We assume
that after an initial unexpected jump of inflation upwards, the distribution of inflation looking
forward is equal to the conditional expectation that we have estimated. Therefore, whereas
in the previous experiments all of the changes at all maturities were unexpected, now only
the change in the first year catches agents by surprise, but they adjust their expectations
right after.
From table 3, we see that more uncertainty lowers the e↵ectiveness of inflation at debasing
the debt. Intuitively, because the real value of future nominal payments are convex in
inflation, uncertainty raises their value and so lowers the benefits of raising inflation.
Also as expected, in case 5, if agents adjust their expectations after one year of surprise
inflation, the estimates are significantly smaller. In this case, in spite of the quite extreme
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shift in the distribution for inflation that we considered, the fall in the real value of debt is
quite far from even 2% of GDP.
7.3 Counterfactual: the time path for inflation
The five experiments so far assumed that the risk-adjusted inflation distribution would
change immediately and permanently. The sixth case considers instead a temporary in-
crease in inflation, with the distribution for year-on-year inflation shifting rightwards so the
new median is at the 90th percentile the next year, but only at the 80th percentile the year
after, and so on, so that for maturities of 5 or more years there is no change. The seventh
case considers a gradual increase, with the one-year inflation distribution unchanged, while
the two-year shifts horizontally so the new median is at the old 60th percentile, and so on
until the fifth year, after which we have the same permanent shift as in the first case.
The last two rows in table 3 show that both of these reasonable deviations from the
first counterfactual again cut significantly the e↵ect of inflation on debt. If inflation only
increases temporarily, the benefit for the Treasury is only 1.2%.
7.4 Why such low numbers? The role of inflation
All of the estimates in tables 2 and 3 are surprisingly small. Even when we considered
unlikely and extreme scenarios, the debt never lost even one tenth of its real value. Why is
this the case?
Table 4 shows the risk-adjusted harmonic mean of inflation for both the baseline and
each of the counterfactuals at di↵erent maturities.20 Even in the most extreme case, in-
flation between 2012 and 2013 never increases by more than 3%. From the perspective of
actual market-based distributions, anything larger than this seems unreasonable. But from
20We take the harmonic, instead of an arithmetic mean, since proposition 1 shows that it is the expectation
of the inverse of inflation that matters for debt valuation.
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Table 4: Expected adjusted average annual inflation for di↵erent counterfactuals
Distribution for inflation 1-year 3-year 5-year 30-year
Baseline 1.5% 2.1% 2.4% 3.0%
Counterfactuals
  1. Permanently higher 3.2% 4.0% 4.5% 5.6%
  2. Right tail only 4.4% 4.7% 5.2% 5.2%
  3. Higher and more variable 3.1% 4.0% 4.5% 5.6%
  4. Higher for sure 3.2% 4.0% 4.6% 5.7%
  5. Partially anticipated 3.0% 2.9% 3.2% 3.3%
  6. Temporary increase 3.2% 3.3% 3.2% 3.1%
  7. Gradual increase 1.5% 2.5% 3.4% 5.5%
Horizon
Notes: Each cell reports 1/E(n/π0,n) the harmonic mean of average inflation until horizon n.
the perspective of debt valuation, these are not large numbers. In order to raise the debt
debasement e↵ect to 10%, it would take shifting the distribution of inflation in experiment
1 so far to the right that the new median for annual inflation is almost 11%. Yet, in that
case, the new and old distributions for inflation would have close to zero overlap, making
this scenario literally incredible.
7.5 Why such low numbers? The role of maturity
Still, over many years, an additional percentage points of inflation can accumulate to a large
e↵ect on debt debasement. If all privately-held debt was at long maturities, inflation might
significantly reduce its real value.
Table 5 investigates the e↵ect of maturity on our estimates by considering the e↵ect of
the higher inflation only on the debt with maturity below 1 year, or only below 4.5 years.
The numbers are significantly lower than when all the debt is included. Moreover, even
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Table 5: Counterfactual impact of higher inflation with di↵erent maturity distributions
Inflation counterfactual 1 year 4.5 years All
  1. Permanently higher 0.1% 1.1% 3.7% 5.1%
  2. Right tail only 0.2% 1.5% 4.4% 5.8%
  3. Higher and more variable 0.1% 1.1% 3.4% 4.7%
  4. Higher for sure 0.1% 1.1% 3.8% 5.3%
  5. Partially anticipated 0.1% 0.6% 1.3% 1.6%
  6. Temporary increase 0.1% 0.7% 1.2% 1.2%
  7. Gradual increase 0.0% 0.3% 2.3% 3.8%
Including only debt of maturity up to: With the maturity 
distribution of debt 
in 2000
Notes: Each cell shows the fall in the real present value of debt as a ratio of GDP.
though three quarters of the market value of debt has a maturity below 4.5 years, the debt
debasement e↵ect is well below 0.75 of our estimates when all the debt is included. This
confirms that most of the benefits from higher inflation come from the longer maturity debt.21
The last column of the table confirms this conclusion. We estimated the distribution
of debt held in private hands by maturity for the year 2000 using the same steps that we
followed for our 2012 calculations. Whereas in 2012 only 6% of the market value of debt
was in maturities above 10 years, in 2000 these long-term bonds accounted for 17% of the
total debt. The duration of privately-held debt was 5.1 years in 2000, compared to 3.7
years in 2012.22 We then repeated our experiments using the 2000 distribution, scaled up
proportionately so that the total market value of the debt is the same as in 2012. The
question we are asking is whether inflation would be more e↵ective if the public debt held in
the private sector in 2012 had the 2000 maturity structure. The answer is a clear yes: the
e↵ects are significantly larger.
21The temporary increase now has a larger e↵ect than the gradual, since the former has a greater impact
on the short end of the maturity structure.
22This is the Fisher and Weil (1971) duration.
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7.6 Reassessing the rule of thumb
The conclusion so far is clear: over the short run, there is too little potential inflation but
plenty of debt. Above 5 years, there is plenty of inflation but too little debt. Combined,
the overall e↵ect of inflation on the debt burden is small. In a way, this confirms the
intuition in the popular rule of thumb that multiplies average maturity by expected higher
inflation to calculate debt debasement, so long as the increase in inflation reflects current
market expectations. At the same time, the introduction showed that this rule of thumb
dramatically over-predicted the e↵ect of higher inflation. Is there an alternative?
Starting with the formula that multiplies outstanding debt by average maturity and then
by a counterfactual increase in inflation, all three terms need significant adjustments. The
first is to realize that what matters is not outstanding debt, but privately-held debt. Thus,
the right number is 51%, not 101%. The second is that weighted average maturity would
only be useful if the distribution was approximately exponential, which it is very far from
accurate. Rather, what is necessary is a measure of duration. Assuming, as we did in the
introduction, that inflation increases by the same amount at all maturities, it is possible
to approximate the impact on the value of the portfolio using the Fisher and Weil (1971)
duration. For the portfolio of privately-held debt in 2012, it is 3.7. Third, and finally, this
calculation can only estimate the impact of a fully expected permanent increase in inflation
by a marginal amount. It is a local estimate, corresponding to the first term of a Taylor
approximation. It cannot calculate the impact of uncertainty about inflation, whether the
change is gradual or transitory, or provide any probabilities to assess what magnitudes of
changes are likely.
Multiplying 51% by 3.7 gives an estimated impact of 0.1% permanently higher inflation
of 0.189% of GDP. Using our accurate formula and our detailed data, in a counterfactual
where we shift the risk-adjusted distribution for inflation by precisely 0.1% to the right at
all frequencies and maturities, we end up with an estimate of 0.184%. The approximation
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is quite good.
At the same time, even this adjusted rule of thumb has serious limitations. The fact that
it ignores the stochastic process for inflation is one. Across experiments, increasing average
inflation as reported in table 4 does not lead to proportional increases in the extent of debt
debasement in table 3, so this can matter a great deal. Another serious limitation is that
the rule of thumb is a local linear approximation. For 1% higher inflation, the rule of thumb
implies an e↵ect of 1.89% on the debt, while the actual number is 1.75%; as inflation gets
even higher, the approximation error can become quite substantial. A third limitation is
that to calculate the duration, one needs to know the entire distribution of bond holdings
{Bt0}t and associated prices. But if a researcher already has this information, then he/she is
better o↵ just using our formula in proposition 1 instead of this local approximation.
8 Financial repression
It may seem surprising that our calculations so far could be silent on the hotly disputed topic
of whether inflation has real e↵ects. One might think that if inflation lowers real interest
rates, then because the government needs to pay less to roll over its debt, the fiscal burden
will be smaller. Yet, if the interest rate is lower, this also means that investors discount the
future debt by less. By our assumption of no arbitrage opportunities, the real interest paid
on the government bonds and the real interest that private agents use to discount the future
are the same. Therefore, in the present value of the fiscal burden, these two e↵ects exactly
o↵set, whatever is the impact of inflation on the real interest rate.
Financial repression is a way to drive a wedge between these two interest rates. This
wedge works like a tax on the returns of government debt and as such provides a source of
revenue that reduces the fiscal burden. The literature on financial repression, which dates
back at least to McKinnon (1973), o↵ers many examples of how this tax is collected and
37
enforced, through channels like caps on interest rates, direct lending to the government by
captive domestic savers, or financial regulation, among others. In theory, this would show
up as a factor 1 ⌧t in each of the terms in our formula in proposition 1. But, at this general
level, we cannot say more empirically about its size or how it varies with inflation.
8.1 Repression as financial regulation
Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011) discuss how many developed countries used a combination of
caps on the interest rates on government bonds and inflation between 1945 and 1980 to pay
for the World War II debt. One particular way in which this is achieved is by forcing the
holders of outstanding debt to roll it over for “special” debt that sells for a higher price (or
pays a lower return) than the market price for identical private securities. This is achieved for
instance by forcing banks to accept this special debt and hold it under the guise of financial
regulation and stability. An extreme case of this hidden financial repression is to require
banks to hold zero-interest reserves at the central bank. E↵ectively, one type of government
liability that pays market interest is replaced by another type that pays no interest.
To model this formally, assume for simplicity that all debt is nominal and has maturity
of one period, and that the holders of maturing bonds Bt0 are forced to take special bonds
as payment that promise to pay B˜t+1 next period and sell today for price H˜t. The price of
the bond is higher than the market price for nominal bonds, Ht, capturing repression, and
below one, capturing the zero lower bound on interest rates. When it is equal to one, we
have extreme financial repression with the special bonds being zero-interest reserves. The
law of motion at any date after 0 for debt now becomes:









Because H˜t > Ht, this expression makes clear that financial repression works like a
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source of tax revenue. Because Bt0 = H˜tB˜t+1, this revenue subtracts from the real value of
outstanding debt just like a tax on its holders would. Similar algebra as the one that led to























Since H˜t > Ht, the debt burden is lower the higher is financial repression. The inequality
binds in the case of extreme financial repression (H˜t = 1), where the government rolls over
its past debt through zero-interest required reserves. This expression shows that the e↵ect
of financial repression is essentially equivalent to delaying all payments on the debt for one
year at a zero interest rate, or shifting the maturity structure by one year.
Generalizing the previous argument to have financial repression for N periods, we obtain
a new version of proposition 1:
















d⇡0,t  !t+N (16)
With extreme financial repression (HNt = 1), the inequality becomes an equality.
The weights in the formula for the debt burden are lower, as long as nominal interest
rates are positive. Higher inflation is now more e↵ective at lowering the real value of the
debt. Inflation not only debases the debt but also lowers the real return on the zero-interest
reserves.
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Table 6: The e↵ect of inflation with financial repression
Years of repression Repression Higher inflation Total
  1 year 0.7% 4.6% 5.3%
  5 year 4.8% 8.1% 12.9%
  10 year 12.2% 10.7% 22.9%
Notes: Each cell shows the fall in the real present value of debt as a ratio of
GDP as a result first solely of repression, and then of higher inflation under
experiment 1. The last column is the sum of the two previous ones.
8.2 Estimating the joint e↵ectiveness of inflation and repression
Table 6 shows the e↵ect of extreme financial repression. The first column of numbers shows
that financial repressions alone, with no additional inflation, can significantly lower the real
value of debt. Even with the low nominal interest rates in 2012, repression for 10 years would
wipe out almost one quarter of the debt.
Column 2 then conducts our experiment 1 within the financially repressed economy, so
it measures the e↵ect solely of the inflation distribution shifting to the right. The e↵ect of
inflation is much higher than before. This confirms our conclusion of the previous section
that a longer maturity of current debt is the key ingredient that makes inflation e↵ective at
lowering the real value of debt.
The total e↵ect in column 3 shows the joint e↵ect, at date 0, of both imposing financial
repression and shifting the distribution of inflation to the right. The reduction of the real
value of debt is substantial. Repression is the tool by which the government can roll over




In this paper we present a method for evaluating the e↵ectiveness of inflation at lowering the
real value of debt. We find that, using data from 2012 for the United States, higher inflation
is unlikely to lower the real value of debt by more than a few percentage points of GDP. The
reason is two-fold. First, market participants expect that inflation over the next few years
will be modest. Second, in 2012, the majority of the debt held in the private sector was of
short maturity. Combining the two, inflation could do little.
To arrive at this conclusion we make five main contributions. (1) We derive a simple new
formula for the debt burden, that shows how the maturity structure of debt holdings and
inflation determine debasement. (2) We compile data measuring the maturity structure of
debt held by di↵erent sets of investors for the U.S. in 2012, and the risk-adjusted marginal
distributions of inflation at di↵erent horizons. (3) We propose a new estimator for the risk-
adjusted joint distribution of inflation over time using copulas and inflation distributions.
(4) We provide value-at-risk measures for the likelihood of debasement, as well as expected
values for di↵erent scenarios. (5) We show how higher debt maturities, either ex ante as
in the historical data, or ex post via financial repression, can increase the e↵ectiveness of
inflation at debt debasement.
One way to increase debasement would be to have significantly higher inflation that
completely surprises the market. Yet informed, profit-maximizing agents view such outcomes
as being virtually impossible. Another way would be to have the private sector hold more
long-term public debt. However, perhaps it is precisely by holding short-term debt that
private agents are reducing the incentive of the government to inflate away the debt, so
that low maturity holdings and low inflation expectations are mutually consistent. If so,
issuing more long-term debt might lead to a large fall in its price. Another way to achieve
debasement is combining inflation with financial repression, which could be implemented
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by forcing an ex-post extension of maturities. Of course, such a policy would likely impose
significant costs on the economy by impairing financial intermediation.
If inflation may not pay for the U.S. public debt, then what will? Since market prices
today put the probability of the United States defaulting at close to zero, the markets seem
to be expecting budget surpluses, brought about either by increases in revenue or decreases
in expenditures. Perhaps inflation itself, while not eroding the real value of government debt,
will generate fiscal surpluses by decreasing the real value of nominally frozen public sector
wages and pensions. Alternatively, perhaps market expectations are inconsistent or they are
severely underestimating future inflation. What is sure and inescapable is that, one way or
another, the budget constraint of the government will have to hold.
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Appendix to “Inflating Away the Public








A Proof of proposition 1
While the bulk of the proof is already in section 2, here we fill in some missing steps. First,
adding and subtracting Q1tWt+1 to the right-hand side of equation (2), and using equation




tWt+1 + st + xt+1 (A1)



























Iterating this equation forward, from date 0 to date t+ 1, delivers equation (3) in the text.
Dividing both sides of the law of motion for Wt by Q1t , multiplying by mt,t+1 and taking
1
expectations gives:






For now, assume that the last term on the right-hand side is zero. We will show it shortly.
Multiply both sides of (A3) by m0,t and take expectations as of date 0, so that using the law
of iterated expectations you get the recursion:
E0(m0,tWt) = E0(m0,t+1Wt+1) + E0(m0,tst). (A4)
Iterate this forward from date 0 to date T , and take the limit as T goes to infinity. With the







Finally, for the first equality in expression (5), replace out the bond prices from equation (1)
using the equations in (4).
The missing step was to show that Et(mt,t+1xt+1/Q1t ) = 0 for all t. Consider the first













































The first equality comes from replacing the expectation of the sum by the sum of the ex-
pectations and from taking the prices known at date t out of the expectation ; the second
from using the result in equation (4) twice; the third from using the law of iterated expec-
tations; and the fourth from using equation (4). Identical steps show that the other terms
in Et(mt,t+1xt+1/Q1t ) are also equal to zero.
The final part of the proof to clarify is expression (6). First note that in principle, m0,t
can depend on many random variables. However, all we need to evaluate is E (m0,t/⇡0,t).
Therefore, only the dependence of m0,t on ⇡0,t will lead to a non-zero term once the expec-
tation of the product of the discount factor and inverse inflation is evaluated. Therefore, we
can write E (m(⇡0,t)/⇡0,t).





d⇡0,t. Define the inverse of the risk-free rate, from
the perspective of date 0, as R 1t =
R
fˆ(⇡0,t)m(⇡0,t)d⇡0,t. From the definition of the stochastic
discount factor, this is the price of a bond that would pay one dollar for sure in t periods,
regardless of the realization of inflation. Then, define the risk-adjusted density for inflation














This confirms expression (6).
B Debt holdings
We construct monthly maturity structures, that is Bt0, for five groups of investors: (1)
private total, which is publicly held debt, excluding Federal Reserve and state and local
government holdings (2) foreign, (3) domestic, which is private minus foreign, (4) China,
3
and (5) Central Bank (Federal Reserve). The data sources are the CRSP U.S. Treasury
database, the Treasury Bulletin, the “Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities” report
available from the U.S. Treasury, and the System Open Market Account (SOMA) holdings
available from the FRBNY. The numbers for face value of total outstanding debt for di↵erent
categories in section 3.1 come from the Monthly Statement of Public Debt, the Treasury
Bulletin (OFS-2, FD-3), and the SOMA. Data are all for end of December 2012 for the
United States.
We construct holdings of notes and bonds as follows. For (1) the data is available from
CRSP, and we subtract out state and local government holdings assuming they have the
same maturity structure. Detailed information for (2) is available for June 2012 and we
assume proportionate growth of foreign holdings to construct December 2012 numbers. (3)
is the di↵erence of (1) and (2). For (4) we combine data on country level holdings of long
term debt with information on the total foreign maturity structure. Note however that we
do not have data on the holdings of China per maturity but only a scaling factor, so we
assume that the Chinese maturity distribution is proportional to that of overall foreigners.
For (5) we use the security level data available from the FRBNY. We assume that all coupon
and principal payments mature in the middle of each month.
CRSP does not have data on Treasury bills. We use the issues of the Treasury bulletin to
obtain information on bills and follow the same steps as we did above for notes and bonds.
In particular, we construct holding of T-Bills as follows. For (1) We subtract Fed holdings
from Treasury Bulletin Table FD-2 T-Bill holdings and then subtract out the proportionate
amount of state and local government holdings; for (2) and (3) we do the same as for notes
and bonds; for (4) we scale the June 2012 holdings; for (5) we use the SOMA holdings.
Aside from calculating debt holdings for more categories of investors, our method for
constructing the maturity structure of (1) has the following di↵erences relative to Hall and
Sargent (2011). First, we construct a monthly term structure and assume that promised
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payments in a month are paid in the middle of the month (instead of using an annual
frequency). Second, we exclude state and local government holdings. Third, we base the
T-Bill holdings on Table FD-2 of the Treasury bulletin and Fed holdings (rather than Table
FD-5 of the Treasury bulletin).
Data on real interest rates is from Gu¨rkaynak, Sack and Wright (2010), available from
the Federal Reserve Board. The term structure extends to a maximum of 20 years. To
construct real spot rates for longer maturities we assume that forward rates for years 21 to
30 are equal to the average forward rate for years 18 to 20.
C Estimating the marginal distributions for inflation
We estimate inflation distributions from data on zero coupon and year-on-year inflation caps
and floors, which we collect from Bloomberg, as do Fleckenstein, Longsta↵ and Lustig (2013).
Kitsul and Wright (2013) use data provided by an interdealer organization, whereas we use
the raw reported numbers.
C.1 Zero-coupon inflation options
The basic methodology for construction of the distributions from zero coupon inflation op-
tions is fairly standard and similar to Kitsul and Wright (2013) and Fleckenstein, Longsta↵
and Lustig (2013). Still, we take several steps in cleaning the data that this section of the
appendix clarifies.
The zero coupon inflation call options are traded with strike prices between 1% and 6%,
in 0.5% increments, and expiration dates ranging from 1 to 10 years as well as 12 and 15
years, although the data for the 2 and 9 year maturities are of generally lower quality. The
zero coupon put options are available for strike prices between -2% and 3% and identical
maturities as the caps. For the overlapping range of strike prices we use both option prices
5
to reduce measurement error.
A zero coupon inflation cap is the most traded contract among inflation derivatives. It
pays, at expiry, the maximum between zero and the di↵erence between the cumulate inflation
during the period and the strike price so its payo↵ at maturity is max[0, (1+⇡0,t)  (1+k)t].
Following Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) we non-parametrically construct risk neutral
density functions using these option prices.
In particular, the price at date 0 a0 of a simple European call option with maturity t,
with a strike price k on inflation ⇡0,t that has a risk-neutral density of f(⇡0,t), and with the




(⇡0,t   k)f(⇡0,t)d⇡0,t. (A8)
Taking the derivative of the pricing equation with respect to k gives the cumulative density









Therefore, we can extract the risk-neutral density by observing how the price of the option
varies with changes in the strike price.
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) suggest using a butterfly trading strategy to construct
Arrow-Debreu securities, claims that pay one unit of currency if at some specific time in
the future the underlying asset price is equal to a specific value and zero otherwise. While
this method provides a good first approximation to risk neutral probabilities, it does not
adjust for irregular options prices, due to, for example, non-synchronous trading (Bahra,
1997). Therefore, while we check that all such prices are positive, we must smooth the data
otherwise the results are very inaccurate.
To overcome the drawbacks of the unadjusted butterfly strategy, we do the following.
First, we drop data that represent simple arbitrage opportunities (discussed in the text). We
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next calculate Black-Scholes implied volatilities, and, following Shimko (1993) and Campa,
Chang and Reider (1998), for each set of options at any expiry date, we fit a natural spline
with two knot point. We constrain the estimated implied volatility function to ensure that
the smoothing does not re-introduce arbitrage opportunities. This method reduces the weight
of irregular data, while preserving its overall form. We convert back to option prices and
construct risk neutral distributions.
To be clear, this method does not assume that we can use the Black-Scholes formula
for pricing. Instead, it is simply used as a nonlinear transformation on which smoothing is
performed.
C.2 Year-on-year inflation options
The construction of distributions from year-on-year options requires a bootstrapping method
where cap and floor contracts, which are portfolios of annual caplets and floorlets, are unbun-
dled to recover prices of the underlying options. First, we use a bootstrapping procedure to
extract the caplet and the floorlet prices from the cap and floor prices respectively. Second,
when calculating the option’s implied volatility we use the Rubinstein (1991) transformation
which enables us to price the option as a plain vanilla option with a time to maturity equal
to the option tenor between inflation reset times, discounting back using the real interest
rate. For both types of options we use nominal and real interest rates from Gu¨rkaynak, Sack
and Swanson (2005).
For each horizon, for the smallest (largest) bin we report the risk-adjusted probability
of inflation lying in or below (above) that bin. Because there was considerable mass in the
last bin (5.5% to 6% inflation) for year-on-year inflation, we use our smoothed estimates to
project four additional bins, so the figures show ranges up to 8%.
7
Figure 1: Marginal distribution for risk-adjusted cumulative inflation at three dates













































C.3 Comparing option prices at di↵erent dates
We inspect option prices at the end of December 2012 (our data of interest) and select out
of the last five trading days of the year the day that yields the maximum number of option
prices that do not violate the threshold criteria, described above and in the text. This was
December 31st, which is the benchmark for our calculations. We looked at distributions for
the 5 days before and after. All of them looked almost identical to the ones we used.
More interesting, we also constructed inflation distributions one month before and after.
Specifically, for November 30, 2012 and February 4, 2013. These days are again chosen
as the trading days that are close to one month before and after the end of December
and that have the maximum number of option prices that do not violate our threshold
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criteria. Those could have changed because of the arrival of news about risk or inflation.
Still, figure 1 shows that while there are some changes in the 1 and 2 year maturities, they
are really small. More importantly, we repeated every calculation in the paper using these
alternative distributions. The results on debt debasement for both the value at risk and the
counterfactuals are essentially unchanged.
D Estimating the joint distributions for inflation
The marginal distributions for inflation are enough to evaluate the formula in proposition 1.
Yet, to calculate inflation paths or counterfactuals, we need joint distributions.
D.1 Proof of proposition 2
Using F (.) to denote the cumulative density function, we have data for one-year inflation
F (ln ⇡t+j 1,t+j) for j = 1...J where J = 10 years, and for cumulative inflation F (ln ⇡t,t+j).
The data comes in N bins expressed as ranges for inflation.
Sklar’s theorem states that there exists a function c : [0, 1]J ! [0, 1] such that:
F (ln ⇡t,t+1, ..., ln ⇡t+J 1,t+J) = c (F (ln ⇡t,t+1), F (ln ⇡t+1,t+2), ..., F (ln ⇡t+J 1,t+J)) . (A10)
In turn, it follows from the link between marginal and joint distributions and the defini-
tion of cumulative inflation that:
F (ln ⇡t,t+j) =
Z
⇧
F (ln ⇡t,t+1, ln ⇡t+1,t+2, ..., ln ⇡t+J 1,t+J)d ln ⇡t,t+1...d ln ⇡t+J 1,t+J (A11)
where the set ⇧ is defined as:
n





Combining these two results delivers the proposition in terms of cumulative distributions.
We maintain the assumption throughout that all distributions are continuous. Therefore,
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Sklar’s theorem also applies to the marginal density functions, with C(.) replacing c(.). For
numerical purposes, it was better to work with marginal, rather than cumulative, densities
in the estimation.
A final point to note is that there are N bins and so N equalities in the distribution,
of which one is redundant since probabilities must add up to one. There are J maturities,
but for maturity one the equality is trivial. Therefore, in total there are (N   1)(J   1)
conditions.
D.2 Parametric copula and method of moments
We use the parametric normal copula, whose formula is:


















where  (.)1 is the inverse of the standard normal cdf, and ⇢ is a correlation matrix of
dimension J .
The matrix ⇢ would only exactly equal the correlation matrix of the variables in the
joint distribution if the marginal distributions happened to be normal. Yet, by drawing from
the joint distribution using the formula above, and calculating correlation coe cients across
many draws, we found that the di↵erence between the actual correlation matrix and ⇢ was
almost always less than 0.01.
To find the estimates, we minimize over the J(J   1)/2 = 45 independent components
of the correlation matrix ⇢ that lie between  1 and 1. The objective function is the equally
weighted average of the (N  1)(J 1) = 20⇥9 = 180 squared deviations from the moments
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in proposition 2. This is a di cult global minimization over a large parameter space, which
we handle through a combination of global and local minimization algorithms and many
repeated searches from randomly drawn starting points.
D.3 Inflation after 10 years
In drawing paths for inflation, for the first 10 years we use the joint distribution given by
the multivariate copula. After that, we assume that inflation is a 9th order Markov process.
Therefore, the distribution for inflation in year 11, conditional on inflation in years 2 to 10
is the same as the distribution for inflation in year 10, conditional on years 1 to 9. Since we
have the joint distribution for inflation from year 1 to 10, it is easy to derive the conditional
distribution for inflation in year 10, conditional on years 1 to 9. Thus, we have the conditional
distribution for year 11, conditional on the draws so far. The same applies to year 12, and so
on, all the way to 30. Note that, since we assumed that the joint distribution of maturities
one to ten follows a Gaussian copula, then this procedure implicitly assumes that the joint
distribution in maturities one to thirty is likewise a Gaussian copula. The key restriction is
that the correlation matrix of 30 ⇥ 29/2 = 435 elements for the 1-30 copula only have 45
independent separate elements that we estimated for the 1-10 distribution.
D.4 Restricted distribution
We can represent inflation between two successive dates (or maturities) as:
ln ⇡t,t+1 = Et(ln ⇡t,t+1) + pt+1 + st+1, (A13)
where pt+1 is a non-stationary part, and st+1 a stationary one, with the two being independent
and zero mean. From Wold’s theorem, the stationary process is fully characterized by its
covariance function vj = Et(st+nst+n+j) for any arbitrary j. The definition of stationary is
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that this is true for any positive n.
The restriction that we impose is that the non-stationary process is a random walk, so
that Et(pt+npt+n+j) =  n. This constrains the way in which non-stationarity a↵ects the
correlation matrix over time. In particular, the correlation between inflation at date t + n
and date t+ j, or the (n, j) element of the matrix ⇢ is given by the expression:
⇢n,n+j =
vj + n p
(v0 + n )(v0 + (n+ j) )
(A14)
While the unrestricted ⇢ matrix has 45 parameters, with the random-walk constraint,
there are only 10 parameters. Nine are the correlations of the stationary part {v1/v0, ..., v9/v0},
and one more is the ratio of the relative variances of the permanent and transitory compo-
nents  /v0. We minimize the same objective function but over this small parameter space.
The estimates when we set   = 0 or estimate an unrestricted   are identical up to 0.01,
and the minimization algorithm always hits this bound for  . Note that in this case, the ⇢
matrix has the easily identified form, ⇢n,n+j = vj/v0, which is the same whatever is n.
D.5 Goodness of fit and restricted versus unrestricted distribution
Table 1 shows the estimated ⇢ for the unrestricted model. Because the estimates vary so
much, they are a little hard to interpret. The two key features that are in common with the
restricted estimates are the ones emphasized in the text: the autocorrelation coe cients are
not very high, and they do not seem to fall with maturity. But the estimates are quite noisy
in that, across contiguous maturities, they jump up and down a bit.
We assess goodness of fit in multiple ways. First, figure 2 shows the data for the risk-
neutral density of cumulative inflation at maturities 2 to 10 against the predicted densities,
according to the restricted and unrestricted models. Our method of moments, following
proposition 2, consisted of picking parameters ⇢ to minimize the di↵erence between the data
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Table 1: Estimated correlation coe cients of year-on-year inflation in the joint distribution
t_rho
Page 1
Table 1. Estimated matrix of correlation coefficients from the joint distribution of year-on-year inflation
Maturity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 1.00 0.52 0.14 0.48 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.28 -0.02
2 1.00 0.35 0.33 0.12 0.22 -0.18 -0.04 0.41 -0.04
3 1.00 0.35 0.22 0.47 -0.08 0.54 0.44 0.25
4 1.00 0.61 0.59 0.69 0.53 0.39 0.31
5 1.00 0.47 0.61 0.68 0.53 0.55
6 1.00 0.40 0.51 0.36 0.42
7 1.00 0.57 0.43 0.44
8 1.00 0.71 0.45
9 1.00 0.52
10 1.00
Notes: Estimated correlation coefficients for year-on-year inflation between date 2012+j and 
2012+I, in column j, row l.
in these 9 plots, and the models. Visually the fit is quite good, and the restriction seems to
have almost no e↵ect on the ability of the copula model to fit the data.
Second, we compare the models’ prediction for inflation in horizons 12 and 15 with the
data for those maturities. Note that this tests not only the normal copula, but also our 9th
order Markov assumption to simulate beyond 10 years. Figure 3 shows the model-implied
and data distributions. The model again seems to do well, with the stationary restriction
doing better.
Third, we compare the model’s predicted standard deviations of risk-adjusted inflation,
with those in the marginal distributions. Figure 4 shows the two models. The restricted
model again seems to do a slightly better job when applied to the horizon 12 and 15 distri-
butions, although again it is clear that, in spite of the seemingly di↵erent estimates of ⇢, the
two models have quite similar fits.
Fourth, we repeated our calculations for one month after and one month before, to assess
whether within this short time windows, the estimate of ⇢ was not too volatile. Table 2 shows
13
Figure 2: Marginal distribution for risk-adjusted cumulative inflation: data and models



























































Figure 3: Distribution for ln ⇡t, t+ 11 and ln ⇡t, t+ 15, model and data


































Table 2: Estimates of ⇢ one month before and after
Horizon Baseline (Dec 2012) Nov 2012 Feb 2013
1 0.36 0.31 0.23
2 0.33 0.36 0.27
3 0.50 0.47 0.37
4 0.48 0.50 0.37
5 0.27 0.25 0.44
6 0.40 0.39 0.30
7 0.38 0.32 0.48
8 0.28 0.24 0.43
9 0.11 0.01 -0.08
Notes: Estimated restricted correlation coefficients for year-on-year inflation
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the resulting estimates for the restricted model only, to save space. While the estimates
change somewhat, the overall pattern that we describe in the text is similar. Again, redoing
all of our calculations using these estimates leads to almost no di↵erence on the e↵ects of
inflation on the real debt burden.
E Estimating debt debasement
We draw 500,000 samples for 40 years of inflation using our joint distribution. We convert
these into 480 month histories by assuming continuous compounding and a constant inflation
rate within each year. We calculate the real value of the nominal payments for each of these
draws, and order them, calculating their percentiles for table 2. We repeat the calculations
using the Bt0 for each group of investors instead.
For the counterfactuals, we use alternative distributions for inflation from which to take
draws, recalculate the value of the debt using the formula in proposition 1, and subtract it
from the original number (51% of GDP). The alternative distributions are:
1. Permanently higher: Shift all the year-on-year distributions by the di↵erence between
the 90th and the 50th percentile at each maturity.
2. Right tail only: We draw from the baseline distribution but discard all histories in
which average inflation is below its 90th percentile in any one of the years in the
simulation.
3. Higher and more variable: For each maturity we multiply baseline inflation levels by
a scaling factor so that the new mean is equal to the mean in case 1. This results in
more variable inflation.
4. Higher for sure: This is the same as case 1 but we now assign all the weight to the
mean at each maturity.
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5. Partially expected: We set inflation equal to 3% in year 1. For the following histories
we use marginal distributions conditional on the year 1 realization. After 10 years we
assume that year-on-year inflation is 9th order Markov.
6. Temporary increase: We shift the year-on-year distributions in the same way as case 1
but we now shift them to the 90th percentile in year 1, 80th in year 2, 70th in year 3,
and 60th in year 4. There is no change in the year-on-year distributions for maturities
equal to and above five years. Note that this is di↵erent from the unexpected shock
in the previous case since distributions in years 2 to 4 are shifted directly instead of
changing only due to the new distribution in year 1.
7. Gradual increase: The one year distribution is unchanged, the 2 year median shifts to
the previous 60th percentile, 70th for year 3, 80th in year 4, and 90th for 5 years and
above.
F Proof of proposition 3
Financial repression consists of paying nominal bonds that are due at date t with new N -
























while the government budget constraint now is:


















The text covered the special case where N = 1, there is no real debt, and all nominal debt
had one period maturity. This appendix proves the general case.
Combining these two equations just as we did in the proof of proposition 1, we end up
with a law of motion for debt:
Wt = Q
1





































Now, replacing the new debt with old debt using equation A15, we get that the nominal



























Canceling terms and relabeling the limits of the sums (since financial repression started at











Finally, recall that Q1t+N 1 = Et+N 1(mt+N 1,t+N). Using the law of iterated expectations
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To get the equality in the proposition, simply use the upper bound HNt = 1. To get
the equality written in terms of the price of nominal bonds, simply use the law of iterated
expectations and the arbitrage condition: HNt = E (mt,t+N/⇡t+N).
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